Contracts

Sherpa.fun runs on Avalanche C-Chain, chain ID 43114, deployed on 21 September 2026 at block 95,820,124. Each address below is verified on Snowtrace, so the code behind the link is the code that runs. Any other address presented as one of these is not.

$SHERPA

There is no protocol token yet. When there is, it will be its own contract rather than a coin launched from PairLaunchpad, and its address will be published here first.

Your coin's own contract

Every coin launched here is a PairToken, and every one of them shows as verified without anyone submitting it. That is not a courtesy — PairToken takes no constructor arguments (it calls back into the launchpad for its name, symbol and supply), so the creation bytecode is byte-identical every time. One instance was verified; the explorer matches all the others, including coins that do not exist yet.

What that verified source says, and what it therefore cannot do: fixed supply set once in the constructor, no mint function, no transfer tax, no blacklist, no pause, no owner.

External contracts it uses

Every one of these was read off Avalanche before it was written down — the factories through their own interface, the feeds by description, and Uniswap V4's helpers by asking each for its poolManager().

Calls worth knowing

Before launching

// Non-reverting. Returns whether it would be allowed, and why not if not.
registry.status(address quote)
  returns (bool eligible, Decision decision, Report report)

// The bar this particular asset has to clear — $10,000 if listed, $25,000 if not.
registry.requiredDepthUsdE8(address quote) returns (uint256)

Launching

launchpad.launch(LaunchConfig cfg) payable returns (address token, bytes32 poolId)
launchpad.predictToken(address creator, bytes32 salt) returns (address)
launchpad.launchFee() returns (uint256)

LaunchConfig carries, beyond the obvious:

After launching

// Anyone can call. Proceeds only ever reach the recorded recipient, the sink and the treasury.
feeVault.collect(address token)

// Creator only. Both take effect from the next collect.
feeVault.setFeeRoute(address token, FeeRoute route)
feeVault.setFeeRecipient(address token, address recipient)

// Reads
launchpad.launchOf(address token)                              // a public mapping: an unnamed tuple
feeVault.launchOf(address token) returns (Launch)              // includes the pool's full PoolKey
feeVault.positionOf(address token) returns (uint128 liquidity) // a V4 position keeps no tokensOwed
feeVault.feeRouteOf(address token) returns (FeeRoute)
feeVault.feeRecipientOf(address token) returns (address)
feeVault.owed(address token, address who) returns (uint256)    // a payout that could not be pushed
feeVault.claim(address token)                                  // collect one

Where the liquidity lock actually lives

There is no lock contract and no locked LP token, because Uniswap V4 has no LP tokens at all. A V4 position only becomes an NFT when Uniswap's PositionManager wraps it; underneath it is a slot in the PoolManager keyed by (owner, tickLower, tickUpper, salt), and the fee vault seeded that slot directly. The usual "liquidity locked" detectors look for LP tokens or position NFTs sent to a burn address or a locker, and here there is nothing of the sort for them to find.

What holds instead is a property of FeeVault, and with its source published you can check it rather than believe it: no code path in the vault ever passes a negative liquidityDelta. Collecting fees calls modifyLiquidity with a delta of exactly zero, which credits the fees earned so far and touches nothing else. There is no withdraw, no emergency exit, and no owner function that adds one. Anyone can read the position with feeVault.positionOf(token), or straight off Uniswap with StateView.getPositionInfo(poolId, feeVault, tickLower, tickUpper, 0). The float cannot come back out — not by the creator, not by us.

Owner powers

The owner can retune the depth bars, the fee bounds, the launch fee, the treasury, the buyback sink, the curated list, the gates and their parameters. It cannot touch a launch's liquidity, change an existing launch's creator share, or redirect a creator's fees.

Ownership transfer is two-step everywhere: a handover that is never accepted leaves the current owner in place rather than sending the protocol to a wrong address.

Today the owner is a single EOA. It should be a multisig behind a timelock, and the contracts do not enforce that themselves.

None of this has been audited.